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The Irish Constitutional Convention offers a potential route-
map for renewing UK democracy
If the UK were to carry out a citizens convention, what should it look like? David Farrell, the Research Director of
the Irish Constitutional Convention describes how the Irish model works, and recommends that the UK follow its
lead, given the constitutional uncertainties following the Scottish independence referendum, the prospect of
‘English Votes for English Laws’ and a potential referendum on our European Union membership 
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The Irish Constitutional Convention (ICC) was established on the heels of the worst economic crisis in the history
of Ireland as an independent state. The Fine Gael-Labour coalition government that was elected in the 2011
electoral ‘earthquake’ promised a ‘democratic revolution’ with an attractive suite of packages, among them: the
introduction of gender quotas; re-instatement of appropriate freedom of information legislation; enacting
whistleblower legislation; establishing a register of lobbyists; making party finances more transparent; and
parliamentary reform (Some less attractive – and in some cases, frankly, potty – proposals included the abolition
of the Seanad – Ireland’s upper house, reducing the size of the Dáil (the lower house), and cutting politicians’
salaries. The government’s efforts to sell the idea that less-government-means-better government  backfired
spectacularly in October 2013, when the abolition of the Seanad referendum was defeated.)
Included in the mix was a proposal to establish a Convention to consider a number of potential areas of
constitutional reform. Ireland’s 1937 constitution is showing its age but it can only be reformed by referendum,
something that has been attempted 34 times – 28 of them successfully. The existential nature of this crisis brought
into sharp relief the need for a fundamental overhaul of Ireland’s constitution and wider political institutions. The
ICC represented a step – to many a far too small step – in that direction, with a rather eclectic agenda of topics
including: marriage equality, blasphemy, the role of women, electoral reform, reducing the voting age, votes for
emigrants (but only in presidential elections), the length of the president’s term of office (the ICC was given space
at the end of its deliberations on the agenda set by the government to consider other matters. Having sought
public submissions, the members voted to devote its final two weekends to the issues of parliamentary reform and
economic, social and cultural rights.)
This is not the first time that a body has been established to investigate possible constitutional reform. But what
marked the ICC out as unique was its membership and how it was selected. Building on the citizen’s assembly
model that was trail blazed in British Columbia in 2004, ordinary citizens were at the heart of the process, only in
the Irish case the citizens were sitting cheek by jowl with politicians: citizens comprised two-thirds of the 100
members, with members of parliament the other one-third.
Following the British Columbia example the citizen members were selected randomly by an opinion poll company
(though ensuring a fair representation in terms of sex, regions and socio-economic sectors): they did not run for
election (as in Iceland), nor were they selected to represent particular sectoral interests as has happened often in
the past in processes like this.
The reason for selecting citizens at random was to ensure that they were there in their own right as ordinary
citizens; they didn’t feel mandated as a result of fighting for office, nor did they feel duty bound to represent vested
interests. This selection process was a crucial feature in the design of the ICC organization, which was modeled
on deliberative principles. These principles also applied to how the ICC operated. Rather than the norms of
parliamentary grandstanding and debating from fixed positions that so often governs the modus operandi of
bodies of this type, in this instance the norm was deliberation – detailed discussion after becoming informed on all
sides of the issue, respecting differing views, being prepared to change one’s mind.
The ICC met over a 14-month period, meeting roughly one weekend a month. The members were ranged around
tables of eight (mixing citizen and politician members), with trained facilitators ensuring that all members had
equal opportunity to contribute (Experts prepared briefing documents that were circulated a week in advance of
each meeting; the same experts then made presentations at the start of the meeting and were available to answer
questions of fact). Each weekend ended with a secret ballot on the ICC’s recommendations.
These recommendations are gradually making their way through the higher echelons of government and
parliament. The government committed to responding to each of the ICC’s reports within four months of receipt by
way of a parliamentary debate. To date, four of the reports have been discussed resulting in government
commitments to hold a number of referendums early in 2015 on marriage equality, reducing the vote age to 16,
and reducing the age requirement for presidential candidates. More referendums are anticipated (most likely on
the role of women, blasphemy, and voting rights for emigrants in presidential elections).
It is too early to judge the success of this ICC: the government has only reacted to a portion of its reports (and
there have been some worrying delays in reacting to the remaining ones); and we’ve yet to see the outcome of
the referendums. But what can’t be denied is that as a process, in terms of how the ICC operated, it was seen as
a great success: many who had been critical before admitted to being converted, and senior politicians from all
parties talk of the possibility of creating another ICC in the future.
Given the ongoing constitutional uncertainties in the UK due to the fallout over the Scottish referendum and the
anticipated referendum on Britain’s future in the European Union, it might be timely to consider borrowing from the
Irish example and establishing a constitutional convention for the UK.
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